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This Article draws on ideas that we presented in March 2012 at a national confe-
rence for benefits scholars and policymakers at Washington University School of
Law in St. Louis. It was supported by a generous research grant from Oklahoma
City University School of Law. It incorporates insights from our litigation of three
significant cases regarding the federal regulation of benefits before the United
States Supreme Court: Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010), LaRue v.
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INTRODUCTION
Last Term, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA).' The Court's landmark decision is a forceful reminder
that America's oldest question-how power should be shared between state and
federal sovereigns-retains powerful political salience. The ACA has been hotly crit-
icized as an affront to state power.' It is now settled that the ACA is constitutional.3
But that is the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end.4
Insufficient attention has been paid to how, in actuality, healthcare regulatory
authority has been and will be divided between federal and state governments. In
this Article, we begin to fill that gap. To do so, we apply "federalism-in-fact," a
theory that seeks to measure the real world, as opposed to theoretical, apportion-
ment of power between sovereigns. We examine the ACA's regulation of private
health insurance and demonstrate that, while the ACA usurps state authority in
some ways, it enhances it in others. Specifically, when viewed in proper contrast to
the previous regulatory regime-dominated by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),6 which federalized the vast majority of private health
insurance-the ACA gives states considerable freedom to enact laws governing
health insurance. Moreover, whereas the pre-ACA population of persons whose in-
1. Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The decision addressed
two pieces of legislation: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). We refer to both as the "ACA."
2. For example, Professors Jonathan Turley of George Washington University Law
School and Richard Peltz-Steele of the University of Massachusetts School of Law
describe the Court's decision respectively as "killing" and "dismantling" federal-
ism. Richard Peltz-Steele, Op-Ed., Dismantling Federalism Is a Shortcut with a
Very Steep Price, FORBES, July 8, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites
/realspin/2012/07/o8/dismantling-federalism-is- a- shortcut-with- a-very- steep-
price/; Jonathan Turley, Court's Top Conservative Kills Federalism, USA TODAY,
June 28, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2o12-o6-29
/supreme- court-roberts-federalism/559014o8/1.
3. We do not invoke, propose, criticize, or rely on any constitutional analysis of the
ACA. Our thesis assumes that the Court rightly upheld, as a constitutional matter,
the ACA's regulation of private health insurance. We focus entirely on how this
constitutionally permissible regulatory authority has been-and will be-
deployed.
4. See Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of the U.K., The End of the Beginning,
Address at The Lord Mayor's Day Luncheon at the Mansion House (Nov. 9,
1942), in WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE END OF THE BEGINNING 264 (1943).
5. Noncharitable health care can be provided through a variety of means, see infra
text accompanying notes 20-27, but this Article focuses only on the ACA's regula-
tion of private health insurance, see infra text accompanying note 28.
6. Pub. L. No. 93-4o6, 88 Stat. 829.
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dividual health insurance was regulated by state law was modest,l the ACA will
cause that population to increase by tens of millions.8 In other words, the state's
"regulatory market"-and its sphere of influence-will be considerably larger in a
post-ACA world. As a result, the dominant narrative of the ACA as a federal takeo-
ver of health insurance should be replaced with a more nuanced-and accurate-
account.
In Part I, we describe the conceptual tools that frame our analysis of the ACA.
First, we describe and defend federalism-in-fact as a scholarly tool. As a general
matter, federalism-in-fact analysis measures the actual power deployed by identifia-
ble regulatory authorities. As scholars in disparate legal fields are beginning to real-
ize, such analysis is crucial to any meaningful understanding of what federalism ac-
tually is, beyond ink on a page.9 Second, because all private health insurance entails
a bargained-for exchange, 0 we suggest that all laws regulating private health insur-
ance can be divided into two categories: (1) sickness rules, which are laws that go-
vern the content of the core insurance promise, and (2) non-sickness rules, which
are laws that govern everything else relevant to the contractual relationship, includ-
ing laws governing enforcement of the promise.
To fully evaluate the ACA's effect on the actual division of power between the
federal and state governments, it is necessary to consider how the authority to regu-
late private health insurance was allocated before the ACA was enacted. Part II
therefore discusses the most important pre-ACA statute governing private health
insurance: ERISA. Under ERISA, states are nearly powerless to enact non-sickness
7. The overwhelming majority of people with private health insurance are covered
by employer- sponsored insurance, rather than by individual (nongroup) policies.
See infra note 24. Employer- sponsored insurance is governed by ERISA and only
minimally by state law. See infra Part II.
8. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that approximately twenty-
two to twenty-three million people will receive insurance through health care ex-
changes by the year 2022); infra note ioi and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Rick Hills, Tough Bargaining by States: Why Not Just Federalize Spending
for the Poor?, PRAWFsBLAWG (July 28, 2012, 9:41 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/07/tough-bargaining-by-states
.html ("[T]he heavy lifting about how federalism actually works is done by tax
guys ... administrative law profs ... and health- and- employment law scholars ...
[while . .. c]onstitutional lawyers ... seem to be the least interested in the reality
of federalism.. . .").
10. Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1746-49
(2011) (explaining how insurance is a bargain between insured and insurer). In
contrast, health insurance received through Medicare and Medicaid entails a pub-
lic entitlement promise made by the government for political reasons, rather than
because there is anything resembling the consideration that is present in a bar-
gained-for promise of insurance between two actors motivated by economic self-
interest. Id. at 1749-51.
11. Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Health Insurance and Federalism- in-Fact, 28
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 73-76 (2012) (explaining our proposed metric of
sickness and non-sickness rules to evaluate the ACA's effect on state regulatory
power over private health insurance).
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rules, and their ability to enact sickness rules is not particularly meaningful. Despite
their historic role in the regulation of insurance, states in a pre-ACA world had little
real power to regulate private health insurance.
Part III explains that states have a surprising amount of regulatory freedom
under the ACA. The first reason is simple: there are many ways in which sovereigns
can and do regulate private health insurance bargains. In attempting to assess the
degree to which the ACA alters the federal/state balance of power, one need consid-
er both its infringements on and enhancements of state authority to do so. Certain-
ly, the legislation favors federal regulators in some respects. But it favors state regu-
lators in others-namely, it appears to allow states almost unfettered ability to enact
non-sickness rules and a more limited, but not trivial, ability to enact sickness
rules." The second reason is comparative: the ACA did not arise from a blank fed-
eral slate. The pre-ACA regulatory health insurance landscape-dominated by
ERISA-imposed extraordinary constraints on state regulatory power. The ACA
provides states with the welcome discretion to unshackle themselves from those
constraints because it will increase significantly the population of individuals who
have health insurance policies that states have considerable freedom to regulate.
Millions of Americans who previously lacked health insurance will now be able to
purchase a policy, and these individuals will populate the states' regulatory mar-
kets.13 States can grow the markets further by encouraging migration from the
ERISA-governed regime. They can accomplish this in part by appealing to employer
desire to reduce their role in the health insurance business. Commentators have al-
most totally ignored this potential expansion of state influence. 14
12. The former question-the degree to which the ACA infringes upon state preroga-
tive-has received considerable attention, in both constitutional and nonconstitu-
tional terms. For nonconstitutional analyses, see, for example, Abbe R. Gluck, In-
trastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011) (arguing that
the implementation of the ACA requires several distinct theories of federalism op-
erating simultaneously); and Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The
Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 113
(2011) (arguing that state resistance against implementing the ACA will have a
positive effect on federal and state relations as well as decisionmaking regarding
healthcare in general). For constitutional analyses, see, for example, Randy E.
Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate
Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010); Brian Galle, The Taxing
Power, the Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of Constitutional Compromise, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 407 (2011); Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health
Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825 (2011); Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for
Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 1 (2011); Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
2209 (2011); and David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey & Jack M. Balkin, Debate, A
Health Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 93 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.phg.
13. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that approximately twenty-
two to twenty-three million people will receive insurance through healthcare ex-
changes by 2022); infra note ioi and accompanying text.
14. Professors Monahan and Schwarcz have insightfully identified and explained the
possibility that employers might "dump" some employees onto the exchanges,
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We conclude by proposing some implications of our analysis. If the dominant
narrative of the ACA as a federal takeover of health insurance remains in place, it
may well influence future decisions about the shape of the statute, potentially creat-
ing a self-fulfilling prophecy of state powerlessness. If, on the other hand, the ACA
is viewed as a statute that accommodates state regulation of health insurance, future
interpretations of the statute-for example, in litigation concerning the scope of the
statute's preemptive reach-may continue to create room for states to exercise their
authority. A more provocative thought about the future of employment-based
health insurance follows: might the ACA, or a modestly reformed variant, allow
states to replace employment-based health insurance with something better?
I. CONCEPTUAL TOOLS
A. Federalism-in-Fact
Federalism, if not an American invention, is certainly an American obsession.
The American polity's commitment to the division of power between federal and
state sovereigns is, as few forget, enshrined in the United States Constitution.15 But
American federalism is more than constitutional. It is politico-cultural, and thus
animates disputes about policy choices even when there is no question that an exer-
cise of federal power is constitutionally permissible. It is therefore of critical impor-
tance to ask about the degree to which any significant regulatory territory is or will
be actually populated by federal actors, state actors, or both. When we use the term
"federalism-in-fact," we are referring to the degree of real world power-sharing be-
tween federal and state regulators.
but their focus was not the regulatory effect of such migration. See Amy Monahan
& Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping
Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 133-53 (2011).
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."). The Tenth Amendment makes explicit the principle of
federalism contained in the original document. See United States v. Sprague, 282
U.S. 716, 733-34 (1931) ("The Tenth Amendment was intended to confirm the un-
derstanding of the people at the time the Constitution was adopted . . . .").
16. We use the terms "functional federalism" and "federalism-in- fact" interchangea-
bly throughout the Article. Both terms have received only modest explicit treat-
ment in the legal literature. The tidiest definition, and one with which we do not
disagree, was offered over fifty years ago by Arthur Miller. See Arthur S. Miller,
The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," io STAN. L. REV. 620, 634 (1958) (us-
ing functional federalism as a term to describe analyses aimed at identifying "the
wielder of effective control in fact over large parts of the American power sys-
tem"). Some scholars use the term "functional federalism" as a shorthand to refer
to the policy reasons as to why, in organizational terms, power should be allocated
to states rather than the federal government, or vice versa. See, e.g., Scott L. Greer
" Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 203 (2010) (using functional federalism as a means to evaluate which areas are
better suited to state rather than federal authority); Michael E. Solimine, State
Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L.
REV. 355, 389 (2012) (referring to functional federalism as a means to assess wheth-
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This approach significantly expands the utility of federalism scholarship that is
devoted to cataloguing different types of federalist power sharing and theorizing
about the possible results of particular allocations." Such federalism scholarship re-
cognizes that, when attempting to set up a power system that shares authority be-
tween national and subnational governments, there are many ways in which power
can be allocated. These observations are not merely academic: different theoretical
species of federalism are commonly held to presage different real-world results.
Federalism-in-fact analysis allows this hypothesis to be tested because it explores the
results of any particular power arrangement that has been or might be adopted and
thus allows observers and decisionmakers to evaluate the degree to which a certain
species of federalism drove, undermined, or was irrelevant to outcomes. Such anal-
ysis makes the ultimate federalism inquiry more transparent, both positively and
normatively.
er a particular power allocation is efficient or inefficient). We do not use "func-
tional federalism" and "federalism-in- fact" in that way. The aim of this Article is
to examine, from a federalism perspective, the contours of health care regulation
before and after the ACA. To be clear, we do not assess the merits of different reg-
ulatory approaches. For thoughts on that subject, see Maher, supra note io, which
examines the theoretical appeal of "opt-in" federalism in the healthcare context.
17. In 1933, Professor Edward S. Corwin coined the term "dual federalism" to describe
a power allocation in which separate spheres of federal and state regulatory au-
thority coexisted. See Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken:
The Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV.
1877, 1919, 1938 (2011) (discussing Corwin's coinage of the term, but noting that
the idea of dual federalism was much older). In 1950, Corwin claimed that "dual
federalism" was dead. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA.
L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1950). Beyond agreeing or disagreeing with Professor Corwin,
postwar scholars spent considerable effort attempting to categorize different theo-
retical types of federalism, of which "cooperative federalism" was and remains a
particularly prominent conceptual category. See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERI-
CAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 84 (2d ed. 1972) (cooperative federal-
ism); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERN-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES 75-80 (1966) (cooperative federalism and the
contemporary regulatory system); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federal-
ism and Cooptation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983) (cooperative federalism); Philip J.
Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 663 (2001). Cooperative federalism itself has many species, but the general
idea is that federal and state interaction, cooperation, and dialogue promote supe-
rior outcomes, both generally and specifically. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harness-
ing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159,
160 (20o6) (rejecting "static" allocations of authority between state and federal le-
vels of government in favor of "dynamic" allocations); Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal
Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62
ALA. L. REV. 237, 241 (2011) (suggesting a multidimensional approach to federal-
ism that considers scale, axis, hierarchy, and "bottom-up" assessments); Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005)
(discussing the theory and appeal of "polyphonic federalism").
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Federalism-in-fact analysis is more than a helpful lens for scholars. It is also a
tool to evaluate and inform political actors. Since the New Deal, the federal gov-
ernment has had vast power to regulate," but it leaves considerable regulatory terri-
tory to states. Indeed, when national legislators consider action, they often mention
and assess the wisdom of sharing power with states, even where Congress could un-
questionably have awarded itself exclusive regulatory dominion." Congressional
restraint and solicitude for state prerogatives are motivated by several important,
and sincere, beliefs. Some of these beliefs are socially ingrained-for example, the
American citizenry has some preference for subnational discretion. Others may be
described as organizational or structural motivations-for example, power decen-
tralization can accommodate heterogeneous preferences and result in superior
rulemaking.
Federalism-in-fact analysis reveals how power is exercised, regardless of how it
formally appears to be exercised or how it is described by legislators. If legislators
claim that states have power but in actuality they do not, then the
subconstitutional intuitions described above will be offended. Federalism-in-fact
analysis may help curtail opportunistic invocations of federalism. And for honest
brokers of federalism-whether voters, agency officials, judges, or elected repre-
sentatives-federalism-in-fact analysis will likely influence their participation in
disputes alleged to have federalism implications.
The rub is that a federalism-in-fact inquiry is rarely easy. It requires a firm un-
derstanding of the formal content of relevant legislation as well as a keen apprecia-
tion of the ways in which those affected have reacted or will react. A deductive (and
perhaps seductive) application of first principles is rarely, if ever, sufficient. Instead,
it is necessary to scrutinize the specifics of the regulatory regime that is being ana-
lyzed, in order to see whether and how the regime inhibits the real exercise of state
power.
18. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV.
795, 807 (1996) ("[T]he New Deal Court [radically expanded] the scope of federal
power over commerce."); Jordan Goldberg, The Commerce Clause and Federal
Abortion Law: Why Progressives Might Be Tempted To Embrace Federalism, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 310 (20o6) (describing how, after the New Deal, "Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause [increased] until it appeared to be ple-
nary"); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1497-98
(1994) (describing, in the wake of the New Deal, the federal government's nearly
limitless potential power to regulate private activity).
19. See, e.g., Fernando R. Laguarda, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of Health
Care Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159, 187 (1993) (describing senatorial arguments to grant
Oregon an administrative ERISA waiver to allow the state to legislate in the area
of healthcare); Nina A. Mendelson, The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Deci-
sion and Agency Interpretation: A Response to Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, 57
DUKE L.J. 2157, 2168 (2008) (noting that Congress considered "abstract federalism
issues," such as the value of states as "'laboratories of democracy"' and whether
"the EPA [was] stopping states from leading the nation on difficult policy ques-
tions," in analyzing the EPA's denial of a preemption waiver under the Clean Air
Act (internal citations omitted)).
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B. Sickness and Non-Sickness Rules
Noncharitable healthcare in the United States is funded through one of several
legal regimes. For veterans, the government directly provides health care.2 For
those over the age of sixty-five or below a certain income level, the government pays
for health care pursuant to Medicare and Medicaid. For those employed with in-
surance through their jobs, a private insurer pays for care pursuant to ERISA and
the ACA." For those who have individual private insurance, an insurer pays for care
subject to the ACA and state law."3
Most Americans are covered by the "Medi-" and the employer-sponsored
insurance regimes.24 These are, obviously, two very different models for providing
20. See 38 U.S.C. § 1710 (2012).
21. See The Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, 79 Stat. 286,
290, 343 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
22. See Maher, supra note io, at 1774-77 (describing the interaction of ERISA, the
ACA, and state law); Amy B. Monahan, Initial Thoughts on Essential Health Bene-
fits, 20o N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION iB (same).
23. Monahan, supra note 22.
24. According to Healthcare.gov, "[t]he 133 million Americans with employer-
sponsored health insurance through large employers (in0 or more workers) ...
make up the vast majority of those with private health insurance today[,]" 43 mil-
lion people are insured through small businesses, and 17 million people carry in-
dividual health insurance policies. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Keeping
the Health Plan You Have: The Affordable Care Act and "Grandfathered" Health
Plans, HEALTHCARE.GOV (June 14, 2010), http://www.healthcare.gov/news
/factsheets/2o1o/o6/keeping- the- health-plan-you- have-grandfathered.html. The
Kaiser Family Foundation cites similar numbers: "Individual, or non-group,
health insurance covers about 14 million nonelderly people in America, making it
the least common source of health insurance. In contrast, about 157 million non-
elderly people are covered by employer- sponsored insurance." Survey of People
Who Purchase Their Own Insurance, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June
2010), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8077-r.pdf; see also CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, CBO AND JCT's ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH IN-
SURANCE, at tbl.2 (2012), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43082 (indicating over
one hundred and fifty million people were covered through employer-based in-
surance and over thirty million by Medicaid in 2012); Medicare Spending and Fi-
nancing, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (2012), http://www.kff.org
/medicare/upload/73o5-07.pdf (approximately fifty million people on Medicare);
David A. Hyman, Health Insurance: Market Failure or Government Failure?, 14
CoNN. INS. L. J. 307, 308 (2008) ("Approximately 61 percent of the non-elderly
population ... receives health coverage through an employer. 5 percent purchase
individual coverage. 16 percent receives government- sponsored coverage, and 18
percent are uninsured."); David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employ-
ment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 26 (2001)
(discussing the large number of Americans receiving insurance through employ-
ment or government).
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and financing health care. The "Medi-" models can best be conceived of as public
entitlement promises that the sovereign qua sovereign makes for political reasons,
rather than because there is anything resembling the consideration that would be
present in a bargained-for promise of insurance between two actors motivated by
economic self-interest." In contrast, the employer-sponsored insurance regime in-
volves voluntary promises undertaken by actors motivated by economic self-
interest." Individual insurance similarly involves a bargained-for exchange.'
We focus our attention on the private insurance regimes that govern health in-
surance for the employed and those in the individual market." To evaluate such re-
gimes, which are essentially contract-governing regimes, we recently suggested that
it would be helpful to divide all regulation of private health insurance into two cate-
gories: rules that regulate sickness and rules that do not." The intuition that in-
spired our categorization is straightforward. Facially, the most salient feature of
health insurance is coverage: what conditions and what treatment are paid for by
the policy when the policyholder is injured or becomes ill. Coverage, after all, is
25. See Maher, supra note io, at 1749-51.
26. Id. at 1746-49 (explaining how insurance is a bargain between the insured and the
insurer).
27. Id.
28. We do so, in part, because a scholarly focus on such private insurance regimes ap-
propriately locates and acknowledges an important American political belief-
one that is not shared in most other industrialized countries. Americans, wisely or
not, have long been hesitant to hand over the entirety of healthcare financing to
government. Cf Teresa Ghilarducci & Christian E. Weller, Issues Still Facing Em-
ployer-Based Pensions, in EMPLOYEE PENSIONS: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, & POSSIBILI-
TIES 1, 1 (2007) ("The U.S. stands apart from developed market economies in rely-
ing heavily on individual employers to achieve the common goal of securing
retirement income for American workers."). Medicare is today a way of life, but,
prior to its enactment in 1965, it faced intense opposition motivated by concerns
that Medicare would "socialize" medicine. Clearly, suspicion of government pri-
macy in health care financing was overcome with respect to Medicare (and Medi-
caid, although that constituency has little or no effective political voice). Nonethe-
less, a significant percentage of the American polity remains uncomfortable with a
Medicare- for- all healthcare solution. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Can You
Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits of Grandfathering Under the Affordable
Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 754-55 (2011) (arguing that despite claims that the
ACA will allow for "grandfathered" healthcare plans to remain intact, these plans
will in fact face significant changes, and further that the ACA is an example of
"regulatory paternalism" which the polity would do well to reject). In other
words, Americans appear to prefer that health care is funded by a private contrac-
tual arrangement, for example, through private health insurance. Congressional
action reflects this preference. In the last fifty years, two pieces of federal legisla-
tion have spoken forcefully on the matter of health insurance: ERISA and the
ACA. Both rely on private bargain models to pay for health care.
29. Maher & Pathak, supra note 11, at 73-76 (defining sickness and non-sickness rules
and describing how states necessarily use those rules differently to effectuate poli-
cy preferences).
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what motivates people to obtain health insurance. Regulations that govern this sub-
ject we dubbed "sickness rules."30 Conversely, we labeled as "non-sickness" rules
those regulations that govern matters other than the conditions and treatments the
policy covers.31
Unsurprisingly, the public attaches great importance to regulation of sickness
rules. But non-sickness rules are more important than people realize. Insurance is a
complicated bargain. It is not amenable to precise ex ante specification. Instead, in-
surance requires the use of terms of art, such as "medical necessity," which require
ex post interpretation to determine actual coverage.3 2 Questions of health insurance
contract interpretation, in turn, depend heavily on rules of construction, proof, and
presumption, and the linchpin of whether a promise is ultimately enforceable may
be rules of remedy.33
Accordingly, we may assess any federal statute's distribution of the authority to
regulate health insurance bargains by inquiring whether states have meaningful au-
thority to regulate either sickness or non-sickness rules. Parts II and III of this Ar-
ticle will answer those questions for ERISA and the ACA, respectively.
II. PRE-ACA REGULATORY TERRAIN
Prior to the enactment of the ACA, ERISA was the dominant federal legislation
regarding private health insurance. Most private health insurance is employer-
sponsored insurance; far fewer Americans are covered by nongroup plans.3 4 ERISA
was not primarily intended to govern health insurance, but rather to regulate em-
ployee benefits, namely pensions.35 Nonetheless, ERISA's effect on employer-
sponsored health insurance was-and is-tremendous.36
Health insurance-and other employee benefits-are not gratuities; they are
nonwage compensation established, in theory, by negotiation between labor and
30. Id. at 74.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic
Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J.
597, 599 (2003) ("explor[ing] the concept of medical necessity as it has evolved in
the judicial and administrative oversight of managed care").
33. For an unusually clear and balanced treatment of these issues, see Peter K. Stris,
ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits, and Bad Faith: Losing Sight of the Cathedral, 26
HOFSTRA L. & EMP. J. 387, 398 n.56 (2009).
34. See supra note 24.
35. See generally JAMEs A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004) (providing a general history of
ERISA).
36. For additional background concerning the regulation of health care under ERISA,
see John Bronsteen, Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and
the Future of Health Care in the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297, 2300-03
(2008) (describing the regulation of health insurance by ERISA); and Brendan S.
Maher, Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit Promise,
2009 Wis. L. REV. 657, 661-64 (same).
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management.3 7 Health insurance and other forms of non-wage compensation-
usually collectively referred to as benefits-are promised in connection with em-
ployment. Wages (or salary) and benefits comprise the total bundle of compensa-
tion upon which an employee makes the labor decision. Benefits thus constitute es-
sential terms of the employment bargain. Although ERISA could have fairly easily
been limited to only certain benefit promises, such as benefit promises pertaining to
retirement, the statute was written to cover both pension benefits and welfare bene-
fits, the latter including, most importantly, health insurance.38
With respect to pension promises, ERISA provides many important protec-
tions, particularly funding requirements and government insurance, but it specifi-
cally does not mandate very much about the promise content. So, for example,
ERISA does not require any particular rate of pension accumulation. A worker with
ten years seniority and a salary of sioo,ooo is not entitled to a pension of some spe-
cified statutory size. A pension promise of any level is protected by various legal
rules, including funding, vesting, and anticutback requirements. 39 But the funda-
mental content of the promise-the size of the pension-is left open to labor mar-
ket negotiation.
ERISA regulates health insurance promises even more lightly than it regulates
pensions. 40 There is, for example, no funding requirement for employer-provided
health care; an employer need not set aside monies to fund its expected payouts on
37. See, e.g., Albert deRoode, Pensions as Wages, 3 Am. EcoN. REV. 287, 287 (1913) (ex-
plaining that pensions are funded via foregone wages); Brendan S. Maher & Peter
K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 437-38 (2010) (noting that
employee benefits are simply wage substitutes); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implement-
ing ERISA: Of Policies and "Plans," 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 559, 560 (1994) (revealing
that "[e]mployer- provided benefits are now a major component of compensa-
tion" and noting that "the cost of all employee benefits constituted 38.4% of pay-
roll in 1990").
38. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012) (defining "employee welfare benefit plan"); id.
§ 1002(3) (defining "employee benefit plan" to include "an employee welfare ben-
efit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee
welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan"); id. § 1003 (describ-
ing scope of ERISA's coverage and identifying "employee benefit plan[s]" as tar-
gets of coverage). At the time of ERISA's passage, employer-provided health in-
surance was far less costly and common than it is today, but there were some
reports of abuse that persuaded the ninety-third Congress to include within
ERISA's scope health insurance arrangements incident to insurance. Michael S.
Gordon, Introduction to the Second Edition of EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, at lxix
(Steven J. Sacher et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing reports of undesirable con-
duct in connection with employment-provided health arrangements).
39. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2012) (minimum vesting standards); id. §§ 1082-1085
(articulating various funding rules).
40. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA's Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 311-12
(1998) (explaining that "ERISA establishes four levels of increasingly intense regu-
lation," with health insurance plans subject to significantly less regulation than
defined benefit pension plans).
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health insurance promises.41 More important for purposes of this Article, however,
ERISA engages in virtually no content regulation of the health insurance promise. 4'
With a few narrow exceptions, no coverage areas or levels of coverage are man-
dated. 43 In other words, ERISA is characterized by a near absence of sickness rules.
As in the pension context, the content of the health insurance promise is deter-
mined almost entirely by the parties.
ERISA does have non-sickness rules, but they do not support robust enforce-
ment of the insurance promise. The statute imposes duties in connection with ad-
ministering a health care insurance promise, as well as remedies for violations of
those duties.44 The content of those duties and remedies, as well as the procedures
for pursuing and enforcing them, were defined in large part by judicial efforts sub-
sequent to ERISA. Specifically, the Supreme Court and lower courts have narrowly
interpreted the remedies available under ERISA in the case of benefit denials by li-
miting damages, court access, and the availability of impartial review. 45 ERISA re-
medies notoriously favor defendants-and have been vigorously criticized by scho-
lars for years.46 For example, an insured who has been wrongly denied a benefit may
recover only the benefit itself; consequential and punitive damages are unavaila-
ble. 47 To even initiate a lawsuit challenging a benefit denial, an insured must ex-
41. 29 U.S.C. § io8i(a)(i) (2012) (exempting employee welfare benefit plans from
ERISA's funding requirements).
42. "ERISA generally monitors only the implementation or conduct of privately-
constituted welfare plans, it does not control their content." Wiedenbeck, supra
note 40, at 312. The content of the health insurance promise is coverage: what
conditions and treatment will be paid for. ERISA imposes only limited rules in
this regard. See infra note 43.
43. ERISA includes very limited mandated benefit provisions, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1185,
1185a, 118 5b (2012), some limits on preexisting condition exclusions, see id. § ii8i, a
prohibition on health status discrimination, see id. § 1182, and limited rules per-
taming to continuation of coverage, see id. §§ 1183, 1185.
44. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024, 1102 (2012) (imposing various duties of disclosure
and reporting); id. § 1104 (imposing a duty of loyalty upon fiduciaries of the plan);
id. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (imposing a duty of care upon fiduciaries of the plan); id. § 1131
(identifying ERISA's criminal penalties); id. § 1132 (articulating ERISA's civil en-
forcement scheme); id. § 1133 (prescribing procedural requirements for benefit
denials).
45. See Maher, supra note 36, at 669-82 (discussing ERISA's remedial provisions).
46. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 Sup. CT. REV.
207, 228; John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, ioi Nw. U. L. REV.
1315, 1317-21 (2007); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Su-
preme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1317 (2003); Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the
Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGs L.J. 131 (2009) (discussing how the Court has
interpreted ERISA in the years following its enactment, and arguing that the
Court has allowed ERISA to become a type of employer's security act).
47. Maher & Pathak, supra note 11, at 83.
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haust the plan's internal administrative process, and the insured may be required to
file suit within a contractually established period of time that is considerably shorter
than otherwise applicable statutes of limitations.4' And the value of judicial review
is considerably diminished by the likelihood that the court will apply a deferential
standard of review, even to decisions by administrators who have previously be-
haved arbitrarily in denying the precise benefit that is the subject of the lawsuit.49
Courts may have been hesitant to construe ERISA in favor of employees and
their beneficiaries because employers possess leverage that is a by-product of the
differences between group and individual insurance markets. Employment-based
health insurance is functionally group health insurance. Thus, while the individual
market for insurance is bedeviled by market imperfections that can effectively close
off that market to unhealthy or poorer individuals, the employment-based group
market is both less naturally susceptible to those market infirmities and the benefi-
ciary of affirmative federal regulation that limits them. A person who cannot obtain
insurance in the individual market often can and does obtain insurance in a group
market. Group treatment is highly valuable.
The catch is that employees in effect only have access to group treatment if
their employer decides to offer employment-based insurance. Judges interpreting
ERISA are faced with a difficult policy reality: if they impose overly demanding legal
rules regarding health insurance promises, employers will simply stop offering poli-
cies. The employees will then either (1) pay more on the individual market for the
same benefits or (2) be unable to obtain insurance on the individual market at all. 0
The restrictive judicial interpretations of ERISA's non-sickness rules are a result of
this policy pressure.
Thus ERISA's non-sickness rules are favorable to insurers, while its sickness
rules are virtually nonexistent. In addition, ERISA couples its regulatory inaction
(on content grounds) and action (on remedial grounds) with a powerful level of
preemption.1 Under ERISA, virtually all state non-sickness rules are preempted,
while state sickness rules are preempted for more than half of employee benefit
plans.
Any state regulation that "relates to" employee benefit plans is preempted by
ERISA,2 and the "relates to" language has been fairly broadly defined by the Su-
48. Id. at 82-84 & 1.46-47.
49. Id. at 83 & 1.48-49.
50. Maher & Stris, supra note 37, at 451-63 (detailing the features of the security-cost
tradeoff that is of central importance to employers extending a benefit promise).
51. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring) (noting that broad preemption with little affirmative regulation has
created a regulatory vacuum); Edward A. Zelinsky, Against a Federal Patients' Bill
of Rights, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 443, 443 (2003) ("For many years, ERISA section
514 was interpreted to displace state regulation of medical care provided via em-
ployer-sponsored plans. Since ERISA itself supplies no regulation to replace the
state regulation ERISA was believed to preempt, there appeared to be a 'regulatory
gap."' (internal citations omitted)).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012)(identifying as preempted "any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan").
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preme Court.53 Generally applicable state common law rules regarding tort or con-
tract, for example, have been held preempted by ERISA.54 As an exception to the
"relates to" clause, certain laws, notably state insurance laws, are statutorily "saved"
from such preemption.5
The savings clause, however, is itself subject to an important exception codified
in the "deemer" clause of ERISA.'6 Because of this statutory provision, employee
benefit plans that self-insure5 -as opposed to plans that entirely rely on third-party
53. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138-39 (1990) (stressing
that the preemption clause is intended to be read broadly); FMC Corp. v. Holli-
day, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (stating that "[t]he pre-emption clause is conspicuous
for its breadth"); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987) (stating
that "the express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive");
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983) (stating that Congress in-
tended the preemption clause to be read broadly); Alessi v. Raybestos- Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981) (stating that "Congress ... meant to establish pension
plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern").
54. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 60 (holding that a Pennsylvania law denying to
insurers the right of subrogation or reimbursement from an insured's tort recov-
ery was "related to" employee benefit plans because "it prohibits plans from being
structured in a [particular] manner"); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (holding that New
York's Human Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law were "related to" employee
benefit plans because they prohibited such plans from being structured in a way
that discriminated on the basis of pregnancy and mandated specific employee
benefits, respectively).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) ("Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in
this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."); Kentucky Ass'n
of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341-42 (2003) ("[F]or a state law to be
deemed a law . .. which regulates insurance under § 1144(b)(2)(A), it must satisfy
two requirements. First, the state law must be specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance. Second, [it] must substantially affect the risk pooling ar-
rangement between the insurer and the insured." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
57. The term "self- insured" is a bit of a misnomer because, although state authority to
regulate stop-loss insurers is unsettled, see Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-
Insured Health Plans, or "One Good Loophole Deserves Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 89 (2003), the majority rule seems to be that plans may pur-
chase stop-loss insurance and still qualify as self-insured plans. See, e.g., Troy Pa-
redes, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope of Fed-
eral Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 243 (1997). Were a state able to regulate
a stop-loss insurer as much as the state could regulate a normal third-party insur-
er, then only those employee benefit plans that truly self-insured would be outside
of state authority. Plans that used stop-loss insurance would be subject to "saved"
insurance laws.
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insurers to directly pay claims-cannot be subject to state insurance laws." Thus,
the "saved" power of a state to promulgate insurance rules-for example, a re-
quirement that a certain condition be covered-affects only employee benefit plans
that do not self-insure. States have no power to regulate employee benefit plans that
do self-insure-and in 2011, 58.5% of employees receiving employer-sponsored in-
surance were covered by insured plans. 9
In addition to this express preemption regime, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped a robust doctrine of conflict preemption. Specifically, additional causes of ac-
tion or heads of damages to remedy benefit denials, beyond those provided for in
ERISA-even if such would otherwise be saved-are preempted.o
Non-Sickness Rules. Some non-sickness rules have survived preemption," but
states have no power to determine the remedies available to an insured who suffers
a breach of the health insurance promise, when the health insurance is obtained as
an employee benefit. This is because the Supreme Court has held that any state law
that attempts to supplement the limited remedies available under ERISA is
preempted because it "conflicts" with ERISA.6 It is not clear whether states are free
58. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61 (stating that "[w]e read the deemer clause to
exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that regulat[e] insurance within
the meaning of the saving clause" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russell
Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How To Fix It: Reinter-
preting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 467-68 (2003) ("In other words, if
an employer acts like an insurance company in the process of providing a set of
benefits to its employees-for example, by promising to pay all the medical ex-
penses incurred by its employees in the future-state insurance regulations can-
not apply in that circumstance.").
59. Paul Fronstin, Self-Insured Health Plans: State Variation and Recent Trends by
Firm Size, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 2 (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.ebri.org
/pdf/notespdf/EBRI Notes 11 Nov-12.Slf-Insrdi.pdf; see also Kathryn Linehan,
Self-Insurance and the Potential Effects of Health Reform on the Small-Group Mar-
ket, NAT'L HEALTH POL'Y F. 3 (Dec. 2010), http://www.nhpf.org/library/issue
-briefs/IB84oPPACASmallGroup_12-21-io.pdf ("Self-insured plans are the most
common source of health insurance for American workers. In 2009, 57 percent of
covered workers were enrolled in a partially or fully self-insured health plan.").
60. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that state-
law created causes of action against HMOs were preempted); Ingersoll-Rand Co.
v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) (holding that a wrongful termination cause
of action was preempted); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987)
(holding that a Mississippi law of bad faith denial of insurance benefits was
preempted). Supreme Court jurisprudence is not clear as to what, beyond rules
that could be categorized as relating to causes of action or damages, would be
preempted on conflict grounds.
61. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (saving from
preemption an Illinois law requiring independent physical review of benefit de-
nials); UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1999) (saving from
preemption a California law that required an insurer to demonstrate prejudice in
order to invoke timeliness as a defense to an insured's benefit denial challenge).
62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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to enact non-sickness rules that impose a more demanding standard of review than
the deferential standard most plans currently enjoy.63 Even when non-sickness rules
survive preemption, however, they do not apply to self-insured plans, as is ex-
plained below.
Sickness Rules. With respect to sickness rules, ERISA at first glance seems to al-
low state regulation. Even though sickness rules will undoubtedly fall within
ERISA's broad preemption clause, 6 4 they will also qualify as insurance regulation,
which is saved from ERISA preemption.6 1 State mandated-benefit laws, for example,
have been held to relate to employee benefit plans and thus fall within ERISA's
preemption clause; but those laws were saved from preemption because they were
considered insurance regulation. 6
This regulatory freedom, however, is illusory. ERISA's savings clause does not
permit state insurance regulation to operate on the massive number of policyhold-
ers who obtain health insurance coverage from self-insured plans.6 As a descriptive
matter, therefore, it simply is not the case that states have much power to impose
sickness rules on employer-provided health insurance: there are millions of em-
ployees who receive health insurance pursuant to a plan that is totally outside the
reach of state sickness rules.
Moreover, whether an employer's health insurance is subject to state sickness
rules is within the power of the employer, not the state. Imagine an employer un-
happy with state laws regulating insurance. Perhaps the employer believes those
laws make insurance too costly, too unpredictable, or too difficult to administer.
One option is for the employer to drop coverage. Although many employers did
drop coverage, others maintained coverage to remain an appealing option for ta-
lented labor. A second option is to self-insure. 6 ' Self-insurance allows an employer
63. See generally Radha A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA Preemption, 56
S.D. L. REV. 500 (2011) (surveying state efforts to regulate discretionary clauses
within insurance policies and evaluating whether such state action is preempted
by ERISA). Discretionary clause bans are state laws that indirectly prevent insur-
ance companies from accessing a deferential standard of review in a benefit denial
challenge under ERISA. Id. at 501-02, 507. These bans should not be considered
expressly preempted, but the Supreme Court could conceivably expand conflict
preemption to invalidate such state regulation. Id. at 508-13.
64. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739, 758 (1985) (stating that a
state mandated-benefit law was related to employee benefit plans but holding that
it was not preempted because it fell within the savings clause).
67. More than half of employees-58-5% in 20n-who have employer- provided in-
surance are covered by self-insured plans. See Fronstin, supra note 59, at 2. Most
of these individuals work for large employers: in 2011, only io.8% of employees
covered by self-insured plans worked for employers with fewer than fifty em-
ployees. Id.
68. In order to fully self-insure, an employer must be able to assume financial respon-
sibility for its employees' health insurance claims. Linehan, supra note 59, at 3.
However, an employer who purchases stop-loss insurance may nonetheless be re-
garded as self-insured and thus within the scope of the deemer clause, see supra
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to reap the market benefits of offering coverage without the hassle of complying
with invasive state rules." And multistate employers who self-insure can avoid the
hassle of complying with multiple sets of state rules.70 Employer strategy thus
pushed millions of employees 1 into the federal regulatory market, because all em-
ployees who received insurance through self-insured plans were outside a state's
regulatory reach.
That the key determinant of state regulatory power is employer choice has a
second-order effect. It is possible that state regulatory initiatives have been chilled
by the prospect that regulated parties could flee the regulation without having to
leave the state for all purposes. When faced with the possibility that regulatory ac-
tions could be challenged on preemption grounds, as well as the possibility that
employers would respond to certain regulatory moves by removing themselves
from the state's regulatory market (and thus lessening the audience of people the
regulations were designed to protect), rational state actors may be more constrained
in the regulatory actions they will consider. State actors have neither unlimited time
nor unlimited resources. Like everyone, they prefer to pick battles that they are like-
ly to win.
III. POST-ACA STATE POWER To REGULATE HEALTH INSURANCE
An accurate assessment of the ACA and its implications for federalism must be
done in context and not ignore ways in which the statute may create or revitalize
avenues of state power. Accordingly, we begin this Part by setting forth the basics of
the ACA and explaining how the ACA-in contrast to ERISA-gives states genuine
power to specify sickness rules and non-sickness rules regarding health insurance
arrangements. Indeed, the ability of states to set remedies for wrongful health insur-
ance coverage denials will be greater than it has been since the enactment of ERISA
in 1974. From a federalism-in-fact perspective, this power is crucial because the na-
ture of insurance arrangements heightens the importance of background legal rules
and because states can promulgate such rules with little additional cost or infra-
structure.72
note 57, so self-insurance is more achievable than it may first appear. Linehan, su-
pra note 59, at 3, 5. The percentage of individuals covered by self-insured plans has
been increasing since 1998. Fronstin, supra note 59, at 2.
69. Linehan, supra note 59, at 4 ("ERISA pre-emption of state regulation of self-
insured employer plans in effect means that such plans are not subject to laws or
regulations that states impose, such as benefit mandates, assessments on health in-
surers, and other requirements for insurers such as reserve requirements.") Line-
han identifies other advantages of self-insurance, id., but the point here is that one
advantage is escape from state regulation.
70. Id. at 3 ("Because benefit mandates can vary across states and even conflict, self-
insurance allows multi-state employers to offer uniform benefits to workers in
different locations.").
71. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
72. Whether such an expansion of state regulatory authority is outweighed by other
provisions of the ACA that restrict state discretion is an open question and, of
course, depends upon one's individual priorities and values.
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Next, we examine an unexplored potential consequence of health care reform:
state regulatory growth. The ACA makes it plausible, if not likely, that the state-level
regulatory market-the number of people governed by state rules-will grow. It
does this in two ways: (1) the ACA expands the size of the market that states pre-
viously regulated,73 and (2) the ACA makes it more likely that states will be able to
persuade subjects (employers and individuals) of a previously federal regulatory
market (the ERISA market) to opt-in to state regulatory markets.74 While the latter
depends upon exploitation of subtle features of the existing regulatory regime, the
potential effects, whether in terms of future reform or as the handiwork of ambi-
tious state actors, are enormous.
Finally, we identify and address some of the limitations of our analysis. Much
discussion of the ACA has focused almost exclusively on the ways in which it cir-
cumscribes state authority. We do not wish to make a mistake in the other direc-
tion.
A. ACA Basics
The ACA represents a significant federal effort to reconfigure the American
health system. It contains a multitude of reforms, many of which receive full treat-
ment elsewhere. At the broadest level, the ACA seeks to provide near-universal
73. See infra text accompanying notes 99-102 (describing how the ACA will dramati-
cally increase the number of individuals subject to state regulation of health in-
surance).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 103-119. Regulatory power is thus a function of
both size of the market and discretion to enact rules governing that market. If
both increase, power increases. If one increases and the other decreases, whether
state power has increased is a value judgment.
75. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1611 (2011) (describing
and analyzing the ACA's minimum health benefits feature); Lance Gable, The Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Health, and the Elusive Target of
Human Rights, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 340, 345-47 (2011) (describing the ACA's in-
dividual mandate and employer mandate, its subsidies for qualifying individuals
and small businesses, the creation of health insurance exchanges, and cost con-
tainment features); Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition
Policy: Antidote or Placebo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811, 827-28 (2011) (describing the ACA's
prohibition of much medical underwriting and premium pricing based on health
status, its minimum health benefits requirement, and cost-sharing features); Alli-
son K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Mar-
kets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2010) (describing structural prob-
lems that may thwart the implementation of the individual mandate and
proposing possible legal and nonlegal solutions); Jessica Mantel, Setting National
Coverage Standards for Health Plans Under Healthcare Reform, 58 UCLA L. REV.
221 (2010) (discussing and analyzing the ACA's essential health benefits require-
ment); Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 133-53 (describing the ACA's crea-
tion of health insurance markets, its prohibition of risk classification in individual
insurance markets, and its antidumping provisions); Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric
Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in Healthcare Regulation: The Federalism
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health insurance coverage in America. To that end, it expands government-
provided health insurance (e.g., Medicare), but it also relies heavily on private in-
surance. Indeed, what is transformative about the ACA is that it takes steps to dra-
matically increase the number of Americans who have private health insurance.
The market for insurance is unusual. It does not maintain itself. Therefore, in
order for the ACA to expand private health insurance coverage, it was necessary for
the statute to address affordability and availability obstacles that afflict private cov-
erage solutions. These obstacles stem from the market reality that the price of a fair
insurance policy is a function of the expected payouts the insurer will have to make
on the policy. The sicker (or more likely to be sick) one is, the higher the premium
an insurance company will demand to offer a policy.
Insurance companies engage in a process known as risk underwriting to ap-
propriately price policies they offer to individuals. Risk underwriting is an imperfect
art. Indeed, in some cases, certain classes of people are such bad risks that insurance
companies will simply decide not to offer policies to them on any terms. According-
ly, pre-ACA, many Americans were unable to obtain health insurance coverage in
private markets because of unfavorable individual insurance-risk characteristics,
such as serious preexisting conditions." The possibility of adverse selection-the
likelihood that those seeking insurance in an unregulated market will consume
more policy benefits than the insurance company can effectively predict-drives up
the cost of individual insurance higher still." Higher premiums, in turn, discourage
reasonably healthy people from purchasing insurance, leaving a sicker pool of
people seeking insurance, which drives up premiums further, and so on.
The ACA addresses these problems with several crucial reforms. First, the indi-
vidual mandate: the statute requires (almost) everyone to purchase insurance.7
Failures of the ACA, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 266 (2011) (describing the extent to
which the ACA's reforms are dependent on state implementation).
76. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. EcoN.
LITERATURE 571, 574-75 (2008) (noting the difficulty of obtaining nongroup insur-
ance); Mark A. Hall, Of Magic Wands and Kaleidoscopes: Fixing Problems in the
Individual Market, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 23, 2002), http://content.healthaffairs
.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2353v1; Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients As
Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 1o6 MICH. L.
REV. 643, 649 (2008).
77. Of course, cost is a problem apart from adverse selection. Even in insurance mar-
kets in which adverse selection is not believed to be a problem-such as large
group markets-rapidly rising insurance costs were making private policies unaf-
fordable for a significant portion of the populace. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our
Broken Health Care System and How To Fix It: An Essay on Health Law and Policy,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 544-45 (20o6) (explaining that even group health in-
surance is expensive and poses an affordability problem); Paul Steinhauser, Poll:
Health Care Costs Too Expensive, Americans Say, CNN (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2oo9-03-19/politics/health.care.polli-health-care-ameri
cans-coverage.
78. 26 U.S.C. § 5oooA (2012) (requiring "applicable" individuals to maintain "mini-
mum essential coverage" in order to avoid specified penalties).
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Second, the statute largely bars the use of risk underwriting. " Third, the statute
mandates a minimum package of benefits that must include what the statute refers
to as "essential health benefits."so The rationale for these three fundamental re-
forms-which states cannot eliminate-is that if everyone is required to purchase
insurance, if insurers are not allowed to price-discriminate or exclude based on risk,
and if the policies sold offer similar benefits, adverse selection will neither destroy
the individual market nor distort it so severely that it is effectively closed to a signif-
icant percentage of potential insureds.81
Nonetheless, even a regulated market may still price the average product at a
level that is too high for some percentage of the population to afford. Indeed, even
for many healthy people-i.e., those without unusually unattractive insurance-risk
profiles-the pre-ACA price of insurance, even in group markets, was simply too
high to be affordable.8' The ACA addresses the affordability issue through use of
subsidies for those at low-income levels. 83
79. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012) (allowing premiums to vary based only on
number of individuals covered, geographic area, age, and tobacco use); id.
§ 300gg-1 (requiring insurers to accept all applicants); id. § 300gg-2 (requiring in-
surers to renew coverage, subject to limited exceptions); id. § 300gg-3 (forbidding
preexisting condition exclusions); id. § 3oogg-6 (requiring coverage for "essential
health benefits"); id. § 300gg-12 (prohibiting rescissions except in instances of
fraud or intentional misrepresentation). For a longer discussion of how the "ACA
attempts to eliminate both direct and indirect forms of risk classification by insur-
ers," see Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 136-42.
8o. See 42 U.S.C. § 30ogg-6 (requiring coverage for "essential health benefits"); id. §
18022 (defining "essential health benefits"). But see infra note ii8 (explaining how
large employers can satisfy the ACA coverage requirements by providing far less
than the package of benefits specified in 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg-6).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 18o91(2)(I) (2012) (setting forth Congress's conclusion that the in-
dividual mandate and guaranteed issue would "minimize... adverse selection");
cf Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber & Robin McKnight, The Importance of the
Individual Mandate-Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293,
293-95 (2011) (finding reduction in premiums in Massachusetts after instantiation
of the mandate).
82. See supra note 77.
83. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012) (creating tax credits to provide assistance in paying pre-
miums); 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012) (creating cost-sharing subsidies, e.g., subsidies to
lower an insured's deductibles, co-pays, and other out-of-pocket expenses); see al-
so Michael Lee, Jr., Adverse Reactions: Structure, Philosophy, and Outcomes of the
Affordable Care Act, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 559, 567-69 (2011) (describing the
ACA's subsidies). The ACA also addresses what can be described as the long-term
affordability problem-namely, that ever-rising medical costs will eventually
make insurance so costly that only massive subsidies that will break the Treasury
could make insurance affordable to everyone-through a variety of other me-
chanisms. Whether the ACA's efforts to control rising costs-for example, to
"bend the cost curve" downward-are or will be adequate is another matter en-
tirely. A full treatment of that concern cannot occur here. Cf Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Moral Hazard, and the Case for Relative Value Health Insur-
ance, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984937 (proposal for a government created CE
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The ACA also attempted to empower consumers as decisionmakers and bar-
gain hunters, imposing various duties upon insurers regarding the gathering, sub-
mitting, disclosing, and presenting of information for government and consumer
use, 84 and by providing for the creation of government-run exchanges, which are
intended to create stable markets and facilitate comprehensible consumer choice.8 5
These exchanges can be conceived of as virtual insurance stores where a consumer
can view a list of state-approved insurance products and decide, based on a uniform
description of each insurance product, which product to purchase. States must
create these exchanges or the federal government will do so. 86
Ultimately, the ACA's substantive particulars on the question of private health
insurance were largely designed to ensure that private markets for health insurance
were accessible, affordable, and comprehensible to all. Whatever the imperfections
in execution, the legislation's conceptual aims were clear: the mandate and the
risk-underwriting prohibition would open individual markets to all, the subsidies
would make those markets affordable, and the exchanges would make them com-
prehensible.
B. Regulatory Freedom
In decrying the ACA's expansion of federal power, critics have focused on the
individual mandate. But, as we explain below, the mandate may not be as great an
imposition as it appears. First, some states do not oppose the mandate. And even
for states that oppose it, the mandate appears a lesser intrusion when viewed in the
context of the entire ACA. Considered as a whole, the ACA allows states to exercise
greater control over non-sickness and sickness rules than they had under ERISA.
The individual mandate certainly infringes on state power. Prior to the ACA,
each state had the freedom to decide whether or not it wished to impose a mandate
on its citizens.8 1 The states now lack that authority: no state may exempt its citizens
rating system that could be incorporated explicitly into insurance contracts);
Brendan Maher, Paul Ryan & Friends, PRAWFsBLAWG (Apr. 5, 2011, 6:58 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/04/paul-ryan-friends.html (dis-
cussing merit of incorporating CE metrics into insurance contracts and Korobkin
proposal).
84. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-9 (requiring disclosure of information to consumers);
id. § 18031(c)-(e) (describing, inter alia, information to be collected and dissemi-
nated through the exchanges).
85. Id. §§ 18031, 18041, 18051 (enumerating exchange requirements); see also Brendan
S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: Choice, Defaults, and the Un-
connected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099 (2012) (discussing rationales for exchanges);
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges and the Affordable Care Act
Key Policy Issues, COMMONWEALTH FUND (2010), http://www.commonwealthfund
.org/ /media/Files/Publications/Fund%2oReport/2010/Jul/1426_Jost hlt
insurance-exchangesACA.pdf (discussing various purposes for exchanges).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 18o41(c)(1) (stating that "the Secretary shall (directly or through
agreement with a not-for-profit entity) establish and operate such Exchange with-
in the State" if the state does not create one); Gluck, supra note 12, at 540.
87. There does not appear to be any accepted federal constitutional argument as to
why an individual might have a constitutional right to be free of a state mandate
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from the federal requirement to purchase health insurance. 88 We do not deny this
obvious truth, but believe it should be put in appropriate perspective.
The ACA formally denies State X the power to not have a mandate in State X.
Some states, however, prefer having a mandate.8 1 The functional deprivation of reg-
ulatory freedom for mandate-preferring states is vastly smaller-namely, it is li-
mited to operational differences of opinion regarding mandate details-than it is
with respect to those states that would never have enacted a mandate. 0
We accept that there are a significant number of states that would have never
adopted a mandate if left with discretion.9' With respect to those states, the regula-
tory deprivation associated with the imposition of a federal mandate is significant.
Of course, that constraint cannot be analyzed in isolation. Whatever magnitude one
wishes to assign to the regulatory infringement a "never-mandate" state suffers un-
der the ACA, that must be balanced by the effects that a mandate (and other fea-
tures of the ACA) will have on state power in other ways.
Consider, for example, three subject areas of state regulatory power-Subject
A, Subject B, and Subject C. If a federal act severely restricts Subject A, that is not
the end of the story from a federalism-in-fact perspective. We must determine what
the act does with respect to Subject B and Subject C. It is theoretically obvious that a
federal act could limit a state's power with respect to Subject A but enhance it with
respect to Subject B or C. Certainly, a Subject A reduction may be more "impor-
tant"-in state power terms-than a Subject B enhancement, but no comprehen-
sive evaluation can occur until Subjects A, B, and C are all analyzed.
The individual mandate (Subject A) may be an imposition on state authority.
But the imposition is not as great as it appears once we consider the ACA as a
whole. Indeed, the ACA increases state authority over its population in important
ways. As we have explained in other work, the ACA gives states meaningful discre-
should the state have chosen to impose one. Of course, state constitutions might
provide individual rights that make state mandates unconstitutional. Our argu-
ment is advanced from a state power perspective; we do not consider any in-
fringements on individual liberty.
88. A state law imposing an individual mandate on state citizens might not be
preempted, but a state law attempting to void the ACA's individual mandate
would certainly "prevent the application of" a key provision of the ACA and
hence be preempted. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d).
89. There are numerous reasons, of course, why a state might decide not to sue the
federal government to seek to invalidate the mandate. But presumably some of
the many states that chose not to oppose the ACA in court chose not to do so be-
cause those states preferred having a mandate-and perhaps preferred so for
some of the reasons we describe herein.
90. We are not attempting to argue that forcing an actor to do X is not an infringe-
ment of freedom if the actor were going to do X anyway. As we made clear, that
compulsion is an infringement on freedom. We are merely pointing out that,
once that baseline (and significant) infringement has been accounted for, states
that would not have done X suffer a greater infringement than states that would
have done X.
91. This seems a reasonable assumption, to put it mildly. Whether states are wise to
be antimandate is a separate question.
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tion to affect both sickness and non-sickness rules.9 A comparison to ERISA high-
lights that grant of authority.
A key sickness rule in the ACA is that individual health insurance policies must
include essential health benefits, which are to be defined by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services but which must include benefits within the ten categories spe-
cified in the statute.93 While this rule may appear to foreclose state regulation of the
content of the health insurance promise, in fact it does not, because the Secretary
has adopted a cooperative federalism approach, explicitly incorporating state prefe-
rences into the package of benefits that the ACA requires to be offered.9 4 The states
cannot entirely eliminate the essential health benefits requirement or remove any of
the ten categories, but states who wish to impose additional requirements can do so.
In other words, states can essentially enact mandated benefit laws for all individual
health insurance policies without running afoul of the ACA. 95
With respect to non-sickness rules-such as rules of interpretation and reme-
dy-the ACA provides very little in the way of preemptive hurdles. In effect, it
leaves the majority of background rules to state determination? Moreover, state
influence, in significant respects, is achievable through traditional and cost-effective
means, namely, by regulations promulgated through existing insurance apparatuses
and by the articulation of state common law (much of which has already been arti-
culated). In our view, the incremental costs associated with these revitalized chan-
nels of state power-i.e., background regulation of the health insurance bargains via
legal rules-are modest and bearable by all states. From a federalism-in-fact pers-
pective, that is important, because it increases the likelihood that states will actually
behave in a way that expands their influence, and not fail to do so because practical
or financial difficulties will forestall such efforts.
The ACA thus gives states meaningful authority to influence both sickness and
non-sickness rules. We note two important points with respect to this influence.
First, the foregoing analysis does not, in large part, apply to traditional employ-
ment-based health insurance. The ACA largely reserves the regulation of that type
of insurance to ERISA. In the first analysis of its kind, we explain in Section III.C
why that is of less consequence than it may first appear. Second, we do not deny
that, in important ways, the ACA does limit state authority to promulgate both
sickness and non-sickness rules. We discuss those specifics in more detail in Section
III.D, and also consider objections that our analysis prioritizes a few trees at the ex-
92. See Maher & Pathak, supra note 1n, at 76-85.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b) (1) (2012).
94. Maher & Pathak, supra note 1n, at 76-77.
95. Id.
96. The ACA's preemptive language is explicitly modest and overtly sensitive to state
regulatory authority. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2012) (making clear that Title I of the
ACA was not intended to preempt any state law unless such state law "prevent[ed]
the application of the provisions" of Title I of the ACA); see also id. § 300gg-23
("[T]his part and part C of this subchapter insofar as it relates to this part shall
not be construed to supersede any provision of State law which establishes, im-
plements, or continues in effect any standard or requirement solely relating to
health insurance issuers in connection with individual or group health insurance
coverage except to the extent that such standard or requirement prevents the ap-
plication of a requirement of this part.").
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pense of the forest. But first, we explain that, in addition to giving states freedom to
enact sickness and non-sickness rules, the ACA will also increase the number of
people over whom states have regulatory authority.
C. Regulatory Growth
By imposing a mandate, the ACA opens up and expands the individual insur-
ance market in each state. Before the ACA, most uninsured people could not obtain
insurance because they could not purchase it on the individual market (because of a
preexisting condition) or because they could not afford the high prices of individual
policies (in part because adverse selection problems had driven up prices). More
affordable individual insurance will now be available to all, so large numbers of in-
dividuals who did not have health insurance before will purchase it. One estimate
from the Congressional Budget Office suggests that 8 million people will receive in-
surance through the exchanges in 2014, and the number increases to 12 million in
2015, 20 million in 2016, and between 22 and 23 million from 2017 to 2022." Indi-
viduals who purchase insurance on an exchange are governed by state law. The
ACA will thus increase the size of each state's regulatory market.
In addition to facilitating 9 the purchase of insurance by individuals who pre-
viously did not have it-through use of mandates, no-risk underwriting, and subsi-
dies-the ACA also sets up a regulatory regime in which states can persuade sub-
jects of a competing regime (i.e., ERISA) to opt-in or migrate. 00 One recent
estimate from the Congressional Budget Office is that 3 to 5 million people annually
will migrate from employment-based insurance to the individual market.0 ' Other
analysts suggest larger numbers.o Such migration will allow further state regulato-
ry growth.
97. See Hall, supra note 76; Hall & Schneider, supra note 76; Jost, supra note 77.
98. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at tbl.2 (projecting 8 million people on
exchanges in 2014, 12 million in 2015, 20 million in 2016, 22 million in 2017, 23 mil-
lion in 2018 and 2019, 22 million in 2020, 23 million in 2021, and 22 million in
2022). An updated estimate from the CBO suggests that the numbers may even be
slightly higher. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COV-
ERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT
SUPREME COURT DECISION, at tbl-3 (July 2012).
99. We choose the word "facilitating" rather than "requiring" because some individu-
als may choose to pay the penalty rather than purchase health insurance.
ioo. See, e.g., Bronsteen, Maher & Stris, supra note 36, at 2319-28 (discussing competi-
tion between different health regimes); Maher, supra note io (examining theoreti-
cal appeal of federalism opt-ins); Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 129
(identifying and analyzing possibility that insureds will migrate to the exchanges
because employers will no longer cover some employees).
ioi. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 1.
102. Douglas Holz-Eakin & Cameron Smith, Labor Markets and Health Care Reform:
New Results, AM. ACTION F. (May 27, 2010), http://americanactionforum.org
/sites/default/files/OHC LabMktsHCR.pdf (suggesting that 35 million fewer
people would have employment insurance). Moreover, as the current analysis
makes clear, the primary obstacle to market movement is differential tax treat-
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While the growth of state regulatory markets via the infusion of individuals
who previously lacked health insurance is straightforward, more explanation is re-
quired to understand how the ACA might cause people to migrate from employer-
provided health insurance to state exchanges. The ACA does not bar those with
employment insurance from purchasing a policy on the individual market; it ex-
pressly allows it.103 There are, nonetheless, obstacles to doing so. First, obtaining in-
surance through one's employer allows one to benefit from the employer's contri-
bution to health insurance premiums. This "contribution," regardless of the fact
that it is styled as coming from the employer, is really nothing more than foregone
wages. In economic terms, an employee could ask to receive as cash that portion of
his wages currently expressed as an "employer contribution" to health insurance.
An employer would be no worse off.
Tax rules, however, complicate the matter. When part of an employee's overall
compensation (the portion consisting of the "employer contribution" plus the
"employee contribution") goes toward purchasing employment-based health insur-
ance, that compensation is not taxed as income.104 Were an employee to simply ac-
cept that contribution in the form of cash and purchase an individual policy, he
would have to pay income taxes on the cash. He could buy the policy only with af-
ter-tax dollars.0 5
There is a potential (but unlitigated) work-around under current tax law. An
employer could establish a health reimbursement account (HRA) for the employee
and contribute to the account the amount that otherwise would have been ex-
ment-something that long predated the ACA-not any substantive provision of
the ACA. If tax treatment were equalized and made simpler-for example, if all
health insurance purchases up to a certain point were not taxable, either to the
employer or the employee-then even more people would enter state markets.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(d)(3)(C) (2012) ("A qualified individual may enroll in any quali-
fied health plan .... "); id. § 180 3 2(f) (defining "qualified individuals" as anyone
who "is seeking to enroll in a qualified health plan in the individual market of-
fered through the Exchange," "resides in the State that established the Exchange,"
and is not incarcerated at the time of enrollment); see also id. § 18031(d)(2)(A)
("An Exchange shall make available qualified health plans to qualified individuals
and qualified employers.").
104. See, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the
Tax Treatment of Employer- Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1229,
1229 (explaining that employer contributions to health insurance are deductible,
and that the value of health insurance received is not included in employee in-
come).
105. Id. at 1229; see 26 U.S.C. § 213 (2012) (stating that tax preferential treatment at-
taches only "to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross
income"). One solution to this problem is legislative: the federal government
could simply treat all expenditures for the purchase of health insurance equiva-
lently, i.e., by offering the same tax and subsidy treatment for health insurance
purchases whether employment-based or not.
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pended to purchase employment-based insurance.o' An employee could then use
the money in that HRA to purchase individual insurance with tax-free dollars.0
Putting aside the HRA approach, employers and their advisors may well seek to
obtain regulatory approval of a tax-neutral, compensation-equivalent way to move
their employees into state insurance markets, where the employee will be out of the
employer's administrative hair. And the reason is not ill intent, it is core competen-
cy. Employers are not in the business of being insurers or administering policies,
and have little independent desire to do so. They provide health insurance to their
employees in response to labor market pressures that are occasioned largely by the
fact that, pre-ACA, employees could not get comparable insurance elsewhere at the
same price.
In acquiescence to that pressure, many employers provided insurance, but were
unhappy about the costs and uncertainty that providing such insurance imposed.s
1o6. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, HEALTH SAVINGS Ac-
COUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED HEALTH PLANS, PUBLICATION 969, at i8-19
(Jan. 11, 2012).
107. The challenge with the HRA path to state markets is regulatory uncertainty. It is
not clear how either the ACA or ERISA would treat an HRA set up to be used ex-
clusively for purchasing an individual policy on a state insurance exchange (and
funded adequately to ensure purchase of a median-level policy on the change).
Use of an HRA in that fashion might not satisfy the current conception of the
ACA's various requirements-and thus result in either an employer being pena-
lized or prohibited from using the HRA at all. Alternatively, use of an HRA might
cause a low-income employee to lose a subsidy. However, as a policy matter, it is
difficult to see why either an individual or employer should be disadvantaged if
the employer is in essence willing to pay for an acceptable policy, while (i) lessen-
ing its administrative responsibilities, and (2) giving all of its employees choice
among those menu of policies offered on a state- sanctioned exchange.
ERISA poses a similar regulatory hurdle, occasioned by past practice. HRAs
are, according to the Department of the Treasury, presumptively "group benefit
plans," and thus subject to ERISA. Id. Whether an HRA set up to provide funds
exclusively for purchase of an individual policy on a state-exchange will be a
"group plan" subject to ERISA is not definitively clear. If such an HRA is governed
by ERISA, then such an arrangement will not push the worker entirely into the
state market, because the policy will be regulated by ERISA. Such a policy would
be subject to a state's sickness rules (because of the savings clause), but not its
benefit denial remedies. Past regulatory treatment of HRAs-in which they were
used as adjuncts to true group plans and thus held to be a part of the plan-makes
little sense in the current environment, in which the HRA is simply being used as a
tax-equivalent means to provide the employee with an individual policy, rather
than forcing the employer to buy and administer a group plan that would provide
the same benefits.
io8. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, supra note 24, at 23 n.6 (2001) (citing S. SILOW-
CARROLL ET AL., THE STATE OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH COVERAGE AND
BUSINESS ATTITUDES ABOUT ITS FUTURE (2001)); James Robinson, The End of
Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2623 (2001); Interview by Patrick Mullen with Re-
gina Herzlinger, Professor, Harvard Business Sch. (May 1998), http://www
.managedcaremag.com/archives/9805/9805.qna herzlinger.shtml.
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There is little reason to believe that-in a guaranteed issue, tax-neutral market-
employers would choose to provide health insurance to employees instead of pro-
viding the cash spent on acquiring the insurance.o 9 The latter option not only im-
proves employee choice, but separates the employers nearly entirely from the line of
decisions, obligations, and conduct that are outside of the employers' core compe-
tency. Indeed, the ERISA Industry Committee, an advocacy organization for em-
ployers, proposed in 2007 to create a health-insurance system in which employers
would be empowered to remove themselves from the health-insurance process,
beyond voluntarily funding employee purchase of health insurance through com-
munity collectives.o
Nor is there any reason to believe that employees on average would be upset by
this change. If they are receiving health insurance worth X in pretax dollars (X being
the sum of employer and employee contributions), then they should be equally
happy to receive X in pre-tax dollars to spend on state-law-governed insurance of
their choosing. Indeed, as we explained above, the federal rules governing employ-
ment-based insurance (in ERISA) are not favorable to beneficiaries, almost certainly
because policymakers cautiously determined that employers would simply stop of-
fering insurance if it became too costly or uncertain." An employee, in short, is
more likely to prefer (and pay some amount more for) the legal rules that govern
state insurance over those that govern ERISA insurance.
Some have argued that employees prefer employment-based insurance because
the employer goes through the trouble of selecting insurance (which is complicated)
and of monitoring the insurer.113 The benefit of employer choice and monitoring is
questionable, given the divergent interests of employer and employees, as well as the
fact that in some cases the employer is the insurer. Moreover, the benefit becomes
extremely small when the employee is moving into a regime-state-run ex-
changes-in which those key functions are performed by the government, rather




111. See, e.g., Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648-49 (2010) ("We have there-
fore recognized that ERISA represents a careful balancing between ensuring fair
and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the encouragement of the
creation of such plans." (quoting Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215
(2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted))).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49 (describing how, by narrowly interpret-
ing ERISA, the federal courts have significantly limited damages, court access, and
the availability of impartial review, resulting in a system that notoriously favors
defendants). Of course, if a state chooses to enact non-sickness rules that are no
more favorable to insureds than ERISA, the employee will not prefer state-
governed insurance. However, even if state rules were the same or worse for bene-
ficiaries than ERISA rules, employers would still prefer offloading employees onto
individual markets, assuming the employee blowback was less than the benefit of
being out of the health insurance business.
113. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court's Assault on Litigation: Why
(and How) It MightBe Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2329 (2010).
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than private employers. 114 And it may be outweighed by the continuity of coverage
that can be obtained when insurance is not based on one's employment.
Small employers are particularly likely to push employees into state markets,
because employers with less than fifty workers face no penalty for not offering in-
surance." Large employers must pay a penalty, based on the number of employees,
if they do not offer insurance that is "affordable" and of "minimum value.""' Thus,
the ease with which an employer can affect migration into state market policies va-
ries. Small group employers are largely unconstrained in their choice, aside from
normal market pressures; they could simply drop coverage altogether, raise wages
by the saved cost, and weather employee complaints about the less favorable tax
treatment (which would be counterbalanced by low-income employees gaining
subsidies). Large employers might do the same: they could simply offer no insur-
ance and increase wages by the saved insurance cost less the offsetting penalty borne
by the employer. That approach, while securing for the employer the benefit of be-
ing out of the health insurance business, would reduce the money an employee
would be able to put toward obtaining health insurance (and offer less desirable tax
treatment to high-income individuals)." Large group employers would need to use
114. See Maher, supra note 85.
115. Cf Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 14.
116. Large group insurers need to provide to their employees coverage that is afforda-
ble and provides "minimum value." 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012) (requiring "any
applicable large employer" to provide "minimum essential coverage under an eli-
gible employer- sponsored plan" to employees); id. § 36B(c)(2)(C) (clarifying that
minimum essential coverage for employer- provided plan requires the coverage to
be "affordable," meaning that the employee's contribution does not exceed 9.5%
of her household income, and to provide "minimum value," meaning that the
plan pay at least 6o% of the costs of the covered benefits). But see infra note ii8
and accompanying text (discussing flexibility of large employers).
The size of the penalty varies with circumstance and number of employees. 26
U.S.C. § 498oH. The penalty is a poor way to force employers to help pay for
health insurance. Employers who drop coverage will need to raise wages or face a
labor disadvantage. To the extent employers can drop coverage and not raise wag-
es, that is a labor-wage problem, not a health insurance problem. It is not a health
insurance problem because those who lose employer coverage can, under the
ACA, purchase a policy on the exchange. That such a purchase is not tax-favored
is also not a health insurance problem. It is a tax and subsidy problem. Cf David
Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform:
Why Further Reforms Are Needed To Prevent Avoidable Costs for Low and Moderate
Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 672 (2012) (discussing problems arising from
"the mismatch that the ACA will create between the tax subsidies available for
employer- sponsored health insurance and those available for the health insurance
purchased by individuals").
117. Small businesses with fewer than twenty-five full-time employees earning less
than $50,000 may be eligible for a tax subsidy regarding employer contributions
to employer-provided insurance. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8941 (Dec. 19, 2011). This tax credit will re-
duce the number of employees who will end up on the exchanges, depending on
how many small employers set up their benefit arrangements to secure the tax
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a regulatory workaround (either one currently existing but not yet pursued or via
regulatory adjustment) to give employees an option to use tax-protected dollars to
purchase a policy on the exchange.1
States might push both groups in their direction in a variety of ways. They can
hold public forums and send out information circulars to the public, to labor lead-
ers, and to human resource and benefit decisionmakers at companies. They can in-
clude on their websites a section titled, "Have a job? Get coverage here!" They might
coordinate with interested employers, and provide on the online exchange a default
coverage option for those looking to spend HRA funds set up by employers." They
can promote a "choose [name of State] insurance" option in online state materials
published in connection with the exchange. States can even offer subsidies to en-
courage both small and large businesses to push employees onto the state ex-
credit. For many small employers, offering no coverage at all while raising
wages will be a simpler solution than adjusting their affairs to take advantage of
the tax credit.
118. One way to set this up is to couple a high-value HRA (equal to the total amount
of employee and employer contributions that would have been spent on a group
policy) with an extremely barren policy. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 14 at
148 ("To take an extreme example, a self-insured employer could implement a
health plan that covers preventive services, the four coverages required by ERISA,
routine patient care costs of individuals participating in clinical trials, and nothing
else."). In such a case, the affordability and minimum coverage requirements
would be easily satisfied and no employer mandate penalty would be triggered. Id.
at 158 ("An employer plan is unaffordable for this purpose only if the employee's
required contribution for coverage exceeds 9.5% of her annual household income,
which the employer can easily control in setting employee premium contribu-
tions. And the term 'minimum value' refers not to the scope of benefits offered,
but to a requirement that the plan pay at least sixty percent of the costs of the
benefits that are covered by the plan." (internal citations omitted)).
Because HRAs cannot be refunded to employees, see INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., supra note 1o6, offering coverage plus an HRA means the employer must
provide both to any employee who chooses the barren policy. Presumably, howev-
er, the cost of a barren policy is modest and could be recouped by subtracting that
expected cost from the aggregate monies the employer contributes to HRAs. Large
employers-those who have over 200 employees-who must auto-enroll em-
ployees in group coverage, with an employee option to opt-out of group coverage,
see Leonard, supra note 28 -would likely do the foregoing. While barren policies
could have an adverse selection effect vis-a-vis who migrates to state markets-
because the employees most likely to choose a barren policy are healthy em-
ployees-extremely barren policies are likely to capture few employees. An em-
ployer could combat this, moreover, by explaining to employees that the barren
policy is being offered only for tax reasons, namely that the company can contri-
bute X to HRA accounts without having to pay the mandate penalty and that vir-
tually every employee is better off buying a policy on the exchange. But see supra
note 107 (discussing the question of the HRA's ERISA status).
119. But see supra note 107 (describing the uncertain status of HRAs used to purchase
individual policies). Even then, a state's choice of essential health benefits would
apply to individual policies purchases.
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changes. After all, state exchanges should offer lower prices the larger the participat-
ing population. Conversely, states can decline to take any of these measures. A state
could, conceivably, adopt many of ERISA's legal rules as the state's legal rules (al-
though, candidly, we would be astonished if that happened wholesale).
In sum, there are several paths through which a state's regulatory market could
become enlarged because of the ACA. One-and by current estimates the far larger
one-is the pickup of individuals who previously were in no market. The second is
through migration from the employer market; most of the migrating employees
would end up in the state market.20 Current estimates are that roughly three to five
million employees will lose employer coverage and end up on the individual mar-
ket. Moreover, to the extent an HRA workaround exists or a similar workaround
arises in the regulatory settling of the ACA's implementation, both large and small
employers may have an option to put employees into the state market assured of at
least a median value policy, while washing their hands of insurance selection and
administration. That path would lead to something considerably more than the
three to five million regulatory migrants currently predicted.1
D. Important Acknowledgments
To this point, we have focused our analysis on the degree to which prior dis-
cussion of the ACA paid insufficient heed to the regulatory context in which it
arose. Doing so, we have argued, makes clear that there are important ways in
which the legislation bolstered, or can be exploited to bolster, state power.
We must pause to consider a crucial objection to our version of the story: could
not states have, on their own, chosen to adopt measures-mandates, exchanges,
subsidies-that would have empowered them to recapture the giant share of the in-
surance regulatory market that had been lost to ERISA? If so, does the states' failure
to do so represent an intentional choice to surrender, of their own choosing, the
majority of the health insurance regulatory market? And is that not the most impor-
120. Without an individual mandate, they would likely end up in no market, or, if
poor, as recipients of Medicaid. While this Article was in late stages of editing,
some states have suggested that Medicaid recipients will be given vouchers to pur-
chase individual insurance on exchanges. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Expanding Medi-
caid with Private Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2013, at A14. While there is con-
siderable uncertainty regarding how such proposed vouchers would work, there is
reason to believe that such individual policies would be meaningfully governed by
state law in a way akin to individual policies purchased by non-Medicaid consum-
ers.
121. There is nothing inherently better in any material way-in policy terms-about
employer- provided insurance, when compared to a guaranteed issue, community
rated individual market. The possibility of lower administrative costs is out-
weighed by the benefits of employee choice and the reduction of agency costs as-
sociated with the selection and maintenance of employment based insurance. To
the extent that (i) the revenue to the government would be the same, (2) the em-
ployer would contribute roughly the same amount of money toward the individu-
al policy as it would toward a group policy, and (3) the employee would not be
treated materially worse, there is no compelling reason why employers should not
have the option of providing employees money to spend on the individual state
exchanges.
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tant idea behind federalism, that subnational agents should reserve power to act or
not in the first instance?
We respond in parts. First, a concession: yes, in federalism terms, it would be
much cleaner and more elegant had the states themselves either enacted reform that
would open up state markets and revitalize state power (as we have claimed the
ACA does) or, alternatively, squarely chosen not to do so. Reality is neither clean
nor elegant, however, and there are many reasons why states chose not to consider
legislative possibilities that are independent of an affirmation or rejection of the
merits of those possibilities. Indeed, there may well have been states where the ma-
jority of the population was relieved that the health reform battle was fought out on
a federal level, with the benefit being that their sovereigns could focus on other mat-
ters. After all, the federal battle exhausted the chief executive, the national legisla-
ture, the electorate, and the Supreme Court.
Our broadest response to the objection, however, is that the federalism-in-fact
"grade" one is willing to give the ACA will depend on the adjudged weight of the
infringements compared to the adjudged weight of the state enhancements. We
have identified some reasons why the infringements are less weighty than they in-
itially appeared, but we realize, of course, that some observers may feel differently.
If one believes, for example, that the mandate infringement is, on a scale of 1 to loo,
a 100, whereas the recapture by the states of regulatory insurance markets is a 2,
then one will adjudge the federalism-in-fact quotient of the ACA to be very low. We
suggest, however, that the sharp reaction against the mandate was based on liberty
rather than federalism concerns.
Here's why: well over 150 million people are covered by employment health in-
surance plans, which are mostly or totally governed by ERISA.1 In other words, the
majority of those plans are self-insured and, thus, totally outside of state regulation;
the rest are plans that are subject to only the state regulation that can survive
preemption. Virtually no one, outside of a few law professors, complained about
the titanic federal intrusion into a field historically dominated by the states.
In contrast, the reaction to the ACA was acute, in some cases hysterical, not be-
cause that level of federal regulation was unprecedented-it is hard to beat ERISA
on that score-but because the federal involvement amounted to a direct restraint
on liberty. Yes, there is a federalism version of this liberty argument-i.e., that
states, being closer to their citizenry, would not have been so foolish as to impose
such a constraint-but we are not persuaded the boil against the mandate would
have significantly diminished if the mandates were state-imposed. We can make this
point even more starkly. ERISA was an historic federal intrusion into insurance
without a pure liberty constraint; ACA was an historic federal intrusion into insur-
ance with a pure liberty constraint. The latter received vastly more criticism, even
though it allows states to roll back the former.
Finally, even if one separates out the liberty objection and believes the magni-
tude of the mandate, essential health benefit, and exchange infringements are very
high, then one must still acknowledge the work the ACA has done to revitalize state
regulatory markets-work that we have explained here in detail for the first time.1 3
Before considering a second objection, we pause to note an important point. We
have talked about the ACA promoting growth in state regulatory markets, but we
must distinguish that from the ACA promoting growth in state regulation. Al-
122. See supra notes 7, 24.
123. See supra Section III.C.
305
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
though we believe much affirmative regulation on insurance has merit, a state can
be anti-regulation and still wish to grow its regulatory market. Imagine, for exam-
ple, a state that was very successful at persuading private players to migrate into the
state insurance market in the ways we have suggested. The regulatory market of the
state will have increased. Does that mean the state will have to "fill" that market
with "progressive" regulations? It does not. A state can wish to grow its regulatory
market and then take a hands-off approach to regulation. Indeed, ERISA captured a
market and then filled it with very little. We believe that some states will do that,
while others may not. That is the beauty of federalism.
We now turn to a second objection leveled against our assessment of the ACA,
namely, that the ACA is not really designed to empower the states in the ways we
discuss. The objection goes something like this: the ACA envisions that most players
will stay in the employment-based health insurance (and federal) market, and in
fact makes it difficult for private parties, be they employers or individuals, to leave
that federal market in favor of a state market.
There is merit to such criticism. Our claim in this Article is not that the ACA
was written as a statute with the primary intent of permitting states to regain regu-
latory authority that was long-lost to the federal government. The primary aim of
the ACA, with respect to health insurance, was to ensure that non-poor and non-
elderly individuals could obtain private health insurance. The mechanisms the sta-
tute employs to do so, however, exist within a profoundly complicated regulatory
maze-a maze that, as we have emphasized, may have more than one exit. And one
exit leads to state regulatory markets. Of course, the path we have described by
which state regulators could attract more people into their markets depends on in-
terpretations of the ACA, ERISA, and the tax code-all complicated matters that
may change or, alternatively, be too uncertain for state actors to exploit.
Statutes, particularly complicated ones, frequently have unintended (or only
partially intended) consequences. Accordingly, we have attempted to demonstrate
that the ACA-cobbled together furiously and resuscitated through the reconcilia-
tion proceSS12 4-may provide, in reality, an opening for state actors to exploit and
reclaim their historic preeminence with respect to health insurance regulation. That
point, and that possibility, has been almost entirely ignored during the ACA's two-
year run as the most polarizing topic of our national conversation.
CONCLUSION
It is one of the ironies of history that long before the term "Obamacare" was
ever uttered as a term of disparagement, health insurance had been federalized by
ERISA-a statute sponsored by a Republican Senator, signed by a Republican Pres-
ident, and largely interpreted by Justices appointed by Republicans. Given the base-
line of ERISA, we conclude that, with respect to private health insurance, the ACA
contains features that have the potential to promote state authority; state authority
that, in the past, had been significantly neutered by ERISA and its regulatory conse-
quences.
124. The election of Republican Senator Scott Brown deprived the Democrats of a 6o-
person "filibuster-proof" majority in the Senate; use of the reconciliation process
was their political solution. See Vincent L. Frakes, Partisanship and
(Un)Compromise: A Study of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 49
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135, 139-40 (2012).
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The ACA, in our view, represents a less static version of federalization than
ERISA. In some important ways, it limits state prerogative. But in others it incorpo-
rates state preferences, grows state regulatory markets, and provides possibilities for
state regulators to attract millions more to their spheres of influence. It is important
that the federalism-in-fact reality is appropriately acknowledged, whether used for
criticism, praise, or reform. At a minimum, future interpretations of the statute
should be guided by a nuanced, accurate understanding of the ways in which the
statute leaves room for state health insurance regulation, so that such state laws are
not, for example, reflexively struck down as preempted.
More dramatically, however, the ACA's consequences may be more significant
than originally imagined by the statute's supporters or critics. In our view, the pre-
ACA world was about employment-based, federally regulated health insurance with
no serious private alternative. ERISA's extensive and unusual preemption regime
bolstered the natural advantage group markets have over individual markets. This
natural advantage privileges, in terms of actual power to regulate health insurance,
whichever sovereign regulates group markets. That natural advantage was com-
pounded by the significant limits that ERISA put on state ability to meaningfully
regulate private health insurance.
The post-ACA world offers employment-based, federally regulated insurance
that faces competitive pressure from individual, but group-rated, health insurance
that is regulated cooperatively between federal and state governments. There may
be reason to welcome this competitive threat, rather than bemoan it. As has been
recognized by scholars for decades, employment-based health insurance is an his-
torical accident, and, but for the grouping function it serves, not an especially desir-
able way in which to deliver health insurance." For years, however, it was difficult
to see a politically viable alternative. The ACA, however imperfectly or unintention-
ally, has created one. And this alternative restores significant power to the states.
Policymakers and scholars may wish to recognize and build on that. To the ex-
tent the ACA as written serves as an uncertain obstacle to state recrudescence, there
are fairly simple reforms that could solidify state power to compete for insureds, of
which the simplest would be legislative: the federal government can simply treat all
expenditures for the purchase of health insurance tax-neutrally"1 and only penalize
employers who do not contribute above a certain amount to be used for that pur-
pose. To us, it seems the federal government's decision not to do so was motivated
by political concerns about preserving employment-based insurance rather than by
a policy analysis regarding the appeal of allowing individuals to choose between re-
ceiving a policy from a guaranteed-issue federal market or receiving a policy from a
guaranteed-issue state market.
Thus, whether through employer desire to get out of the business of health in-
surance, ambitious state action, legislative reform, or all three, the ultimate legacy of
the ACA may be a movement away from an ossified system of employment-based
insurance almost exclusively regulated by the federal government toward a more
fluid system of state-inspired regulatory competition and coverage for all.
125. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ralph Pettit, Help! We've Fallen and We Can't Get Up: The Prob-
lems Families Face Because of Employment-Based Health Insurance, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 779, 784 (1993) ("Health insurance became employment-based almost by ac-
cident.").
126. By tax-neutrally, we mean treated equivalently. We take no position on the ap-
propriate level of preferential tax treatment.
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